Given China’s role in the historic reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and in promoting negotiations among rival Palestinian factions, Western scholars are convinced that China is projecting more power into the Middle East in a fierce competition with the US for global dominance.
On July 31, barely a week after 14 Palestinian factions signed the Beijing Declaration calling for unity, a Hamas leader was assassinated in Iran. Some saw this as a significant provocation of China and suggested Beijing go beyond condemning the killing with words, to respond with action.
But will these events really prompt China to play a bigger role in the Middle East, even directly intervene in the region’s affairs? The answer should be no.
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Palestinian factions agree to end division in pact brokered by China
Palestinian factions agree to end division in pact brokered by China
When we distance ourselves from conceptual frameworks like the Thucydides Trap and look back on a longer history, we see that China today does not necessarily position itself like the US in the 1970s, when it brokered the Camp David Accords. China does not see the Beijing Declaration as a defence of its regional influence.
Instead, China is behaving more like the US in 1914, adhering to a neutral role in mediating conflict so as to create more opportunities for its own peaceful development, rather than obsessing over global hegemony.
Meanwhile, America today increasingly resembles the British Empire of the time, which had abandoned its “splendid isolation” to become dragged into wars in Europe and the Middle East, exhausting its hegemonic influence even as it failed to curb the rise of emerging powers from across the ocean. History has repeatedly shown that empires perish from overexpansion.
Chinese scholars could transform their theoretical perspective and consider isolationism, its value and the behavioural patterns. To do this, it is useful to examine the US of over a century ago and how it successfully navigated an increasingly chaotic world order.
After a period of rapid economic growth, during the progressive era between 1901 and 1929, America’s social contradictions intensified. If the US had chosen then to intervene in the European wars, both its German immigrants and Anglo-Saxon voters would have become destabilising factors during an already difficult time.
When the first world war broke out in 1914, president Woodrow Wilson declared US neutrality and concentrated on progressive reforms at home, such as the 1916 Keating-Owen Child Labour Act and Adamson Act, which established an eight-hour workday.
The government began protecting labour rights, creating a direct link between the state and labour, and consolidating the nation’s social foundations, which turned out useful later for wartime mobilisation.
Similarly, after decades of rapid development, China faces significant risks in areas like real estate and labour relations, which are detrimental to social solidarity. The Communist Party recognises these challenges and is committed to promoting comprehensive and deep reforms.
Therefore, in the wake of the third plenum, China’s leadership will allocate the most attention to economic reforms, rather than intervening in the chaotic international situation.
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China’s Communist Party wraps up policy meeting amid growing uncertainties
China’s Communist Party wraps up policy meeting amid growing uncertainties
Isolationism does not mean diplomatic inactivity. A rising power can aim to create a safe environment so it can maintain its strategic focus; it can also contribute to international norms. President Wilson’s theory of public administration became the successful practice of political centralisation, and his “Fourteen Points” statement of the principles for peace was used to negotiate the end of the world war.
Similarly, China’s leadership has proposed global initiatives such as a shared future for mankind, and is exploring adjustments in the administrative relationship between the central and local governments. Notably, the Chinese leadership continues to fine-tune its mechanisms for feedback and discussion to harness collective wisdom, and to improve decision-making through consultative democracy, such as symposia with non-party individuals.
Finally, isolationism does not mean turning a blind eye to catastrophes such as the plight of Gaza; counter-intuitively, it can lead a country to behave in a more humanitarian way.
China, for instance, has held off directly intervening in the conflicts in the Middle East, perhaps due to an isolationist instinct. If it had, however, the likely result would not be a rescue but a more complicated situation and probably more conflicts. As often noted, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Shi Quan is a PhD candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University