On August 9, 1945, US president Harry Truman announced the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and told the nation: “The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world.” Despite the establishment of a post-war international order, the Cold War and its proxy conflicts, notably the Korean war, inflicted great suffering on Northeast Asia.
With the end of the Cold War and the start of sustained peace, stability and globalisation, Northeast Asia became one of the most prosperous places on earth. But today, its security situation is once again in a dangerous position.
History has rhymed in three aspects. Firstly, geopolitical competition has led to a resurgence of military blocs in the region. Secondly, as globalisation and the liberal international order decline, regional coordination mechanisms are failing. Thirdly, the risk of nuclear proliferation has dramatically increased.
Specifically, the return of Cold War thinking in Washington and some Northeast Asian countries as well as increasing polarisation and bloc competition has heightened the risk of conflict.
Recent high-level interactions within the US-Japan-South Korea and Russia-North Korea camps have intensified the regional arms race. The historic Camp David summit between Joe Biden, Yoon Suk-yeol and Fumio Kishida, and the high-profile meetings of Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin have elevated these military alliances. This has led to accusations that the other side is creating an Asian mini-Nato or a China-North Korea-Russia axis.
The worry is that history will repeat, like with the north vs south triangles of the Cold War era – China, the Soviet Union and North Korea against the United States, Japan and South Korea.
Responding to risks by forming blocs will not make the region more secure, instead, it would destabilise and amplify the risk of war, not just in the Korean peninsula, but also in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
Cooperation mechanisms, like the six-party talks to negotiate for the end of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, have completely collapsed and the trust deficit is increasing. Geopolitical competition has made US-China coordination difficult, and other countries do not have sufficient interest in the resumption of these mechanisms. China believes the “crux of the problem is the lack of mutual trust” between the US and North Korea, while the US believes China and Russia’s support for North Korea makes sanctions ineffective and increases the nuclear threat.
The result is that nuclear and other arms have proliferated in this “lawless” region. It was almost inevitable that North Korea would test weapons in an US election year. What’s more, the possibility of Trump 2.0 has escalated regional tensions. While former president Donald Trump did sit down with Kim, they never achieved make-or-break dialogue, and there is no mention of a second summit in the 2024 Republican Party platform.
Sceptics do not believe Trump can turn a good personal relationship with Kim into a good deal. Under these circumstances, South Korea’s hardline Yoon government is preparing for a reduction in US support by increasing its military spending, and even considering tactical nuclear weapons. Japan has also significantly expanded its defence budget, and just conducted its first joint maritime exercise with Taiwan’s coast guard since the two sides cut diplomatic ties in 1972.
The Biden administration’s decoupling policy also poses threats to the region’s security. The complementarity and interdependence of trade ties between China, Japan and South Korea have been weaponised in the context of securitisation and politicisation.
The previous Trump administration’s use of tariffs and export controls did not address the inherent issues with globalisation. The policies, many of which were continued and expanded upon by the Biden administration, resulted in the fragmentation of the global supply chain.
03:10
BIDEN OR TRUMP: WHOEVER WINS, WE LOSE
BIDEN OR TRUMP: WHOEVER WINS, WE LOSE
Northeast Asia is the next powder keg region. But there are three silver linings.
Firstly, regional cooperation can alleviate uncertainty. The resumption of the China-South Korea-Japan summit in Seoul in May is an example of reinvesting in trilateral cooperation. Plans including the “Trilateral+X Cooperation” will contribute to global governance and promote re-globalisation by providing public goods in areas such as climate and health. The gap in cooperation over the pandemic years needs time to resolve, however, and the recent talks were mostly dominated by low-sensitivity issues.
Secondly, the Global South, particularly much of Southeast Asia, have remained neutral in the face of the geopolitical competition, instead benefiting from development-oriented regional economic integration, such as with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a free-trade pact that is advancing the formation of one of the world’s biggest supply chain hubs.
Thirdly, from the 2022 Bali consensus to the San Francisco summit, China and the US have shown a reluctance to let relations spiral downwards. Preventing the outbreak of a crisis in Northeast Asia may become the new convergence of interest. After all, when atomic bombs meet artificial intelligence, neither opportunism nor standing idly by is an option – the global harm is simply too great.
Northeast Asia has produced economic miracles since the Korean war ceasefire in 1953. A new road map to maintain peace and regional economic cooperation will bring hope in a turbulent world.
Li Cheng is professor of political science and founding director of the Centre on Contemporary China and the World (CCCW) at the University of Hong Kong
